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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the many widely ratified treaties on the law of armed
conflict (LOAC, also referred to as international humanitarian law
(IHL)), customary international law remains of great importance in
this branch of international law. So far as concerns international
armed conflicts, customary international humanitarian law (CIHL) is
of special importance in connection with states not party to Additional
Protocol I of 1977.1 So far as concerns non-international armed
conflicts, CIHL is of crucial importance for all states, since, for the most
part, treaty provisions are rudimentary. The International Court of
Justice has also had occasion to state that "a great many rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict . .. are to be observed
by all states whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law."
2
* Sir Michael Wood, KCMG, barrister, 20 Essex Street, London; Member of the UN
International Law Commission, and Special Rapporteur for the topic Identification of
customary international law. The author thanks Omri Sender for his assistance in
preparing this contribution.
1. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. States not party to the Protocol include Israel and the United
States.
2. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 79 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Nuclear Weapons Opinion].
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The present contribution concerns the evolution and identification
of CIHL. It does not deal with the substance of that law, on which there
is a good deal of material, including in the impressive study under the
auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 3 It
addresses in particular the relevance for CIHL of the UN International
Law Commission (ILC)'s recent work on the topic Identification of
customary international law.4 While working on the topic, the
Commission had LOAC very much in mind and tried to take into
account lessons learned in the field of CIHL.
Identification and evolution of the law are obviously not the same
thing, but as the ILC noted when it changed the topic's title from
Formation and evidence of customary international law to
Identification of customary international law, in that context they are
in many ways closely related.5 In particular, the requirement-for
identification of customary international law-to ascertain "a general
practice" that is "accepted as law" reflects the fact that rules of
customary international law evolve through a general practice and
opiniojuris. In other words, the two constituent elements of customary
international law are also the twin criteria for its identification. The
ILC's commentary to draft conclusion 1 on the topic, adopted on first
reading in 2016, thus notes:
Dealing as they do with the identification of rules of customary international
law, the draft conclusions do not address, directly, the processes by which
customary international law develops over time. Yet in practice identification
cannot always be considered in isolation from formation; the identification of the
existence and content of a rule of customary international law may well involve
consideration of the processes by which it has developed. The draft conclusions
thus inevitably refer in places to the formation of rules; they do not, however,
deal systematically with how rules emerge, or how they change or terminate.6
3. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005) [hereinafter ICRC STUDY]; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for
the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175 (2005); see also Michael
Wood (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Rep. on Identification of Customary International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/695/Add.1 (May 25, 2016) (enumerating other writings on the
customary international law of armed conflict, including the role of nonstate actors in
the customary process).
4. See generally Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session,
U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 305-14 (2011); see also Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its
Sixty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/67/10, at 133 (2012) (recording the decision to include
the topic on the Commission's current programme of work).
5. For the change of title, see Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-
Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, at 93 (2013).
6. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/71/10, at 81 (2016) [hereinafter ILC Report 2016]. The full set of sixteen draft
conclusions (with commentaries) was adopted on first reading following debate within
the ILC, its Drafting Committee, and a working group, over four sessions (2013-2016).
A second (and final) reading is expected in 2018.
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II. THE METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING CIHL
The ILC took up the topic identification of customary international
law in 2012, as there was felt to be a need for some reasonably
authoritative guidance on the methodology to be employed in
identifying rules of customary international law and their content.
This need resulted largely from the difficulties sometimes encountered
by national courts in this regard, as well as from the potential
confusion to which the theories propounded by various writers might
give rise.
When the ILC began its work on the topic in 2012, almost the only
recent and reasonably detailed statements by states on how rules of
customary international law were to be identified were those
stimulated by the ICRC study on CIHL. The very fact that the ICRC
had produced its study gave rise to important statements on how to
identify rules of customary international law, not only by certain
governments,7 but also by the ICRC itself and by individual experts.
This has also been the effect of the ILC's own work on the topic; but at
its outset, the Commission benefitted greatly from the debate
concerning the methodology referred to by the ICRC authors. That
methodology also has much in common with the methodology set out
by the ILC in its draft conclusions.
To begin with, an important conclusion of the ILC, as of the ICRC,
is that the same basic approach-the two-element approach-applies
to the identification of the existence and content of rules of customary
international law in all fields of international law. This is confirmed in
the practice of states and in the case law. It is also consistent with the
unity and coherence of international law, which is a single legal system
and is not divided into separate branches, each with its own approach
to sources.8 This includes CIHL, just as it includes customary
international human rights law.
At the same time, the ILC's commentary acknowledges that the
application in practice of the basic approach may well take into account
the particular circumstances and context in which an alleged rule has
arisen and operates.9 The ILC's draft conclusion 3 similarly recognizes
the need for such flexibility, stating, in part, that:
7. See, e.g., J.B. Bellinger, III & W.J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 443 (2007); Legal Adviser of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Statement at the Meeting of National Committees on
International Humanitarian Law of Commonwealth States, Nairobi, 20 July 2005, 76
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 694 (2005); PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007).
8. ILC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 84.
9. Id.; see also, by way of example, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger.
v. It.; Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 1 55 (Feb. 3).
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In assessing evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a general
practice and whether that practice is accepted as law (opinio juris), regard must
be had to the overall context, the nature of the rule, and the particular
circumstances in which the evidence in question is to be found.10
This means, inter alia, that the type of evidence consulted (and
consideration of its availability or otherwise) ought to be adjusted to
the situation at hand and that certain forms of practice and evidence
of acceptance as law (opinio juris) may be of particular significance
depending on the context. The reference to the "nature of the rule"
indicates, for example, that where prohibitive rules are concerned, it
may sometimes be difficult to find positive state practice (as opposed
to state inaction); cases involving such alleged rules will thus most
likely turn on evaluating whether there is deliberate inaction that is
accepted as law.
Such issues may well arise when applying the two-element
methodology in the field of the LOAC. Operational conduct "on the
ground," for example, which the ILC's conclusion 6 refers to among the
possible "forms of practice," is not always easily accessible. (The
commentary to this provision explains that "[o]perational conduct 'on
the ground' includes law enforcement and seizure of property, as well
as battlefield or other military activity, such as the movement of troops
or vessels, or deployment of certain weapons."") At times it may be
unclear whether it reflects official policy at all. In such situations,
military manuals may assume particular relevance. As for prohibitive
rules, one may recall the International Court of Justice's finding in its
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons that "the members of the international community are
profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear
weapons over the past 50 years constitutes the expression of an opinio
juris. Under these circumstances the Court does not consider itself able
to find that there is such an opinio juris."'2 This is a reminder, if you
will, of the importance for states to make clear their opinio juris when
interest or circumstances so require.
CIHL provided fertile ground for considering other general
questions, such as the old debate on whether statements (as opposed
to physical conduct not limited to words) may qualify as practice for
the purposes of customary international law. While cautioning that
words cannot always be taken at face value, the ILC readily accepted
that practice may comprise both physical and verbal (written and oral)
conduct; taking a contrary view might be seen as encouraging
confrontation and, in some cases, even the use of force.'3 It was also
10. ILC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 76.
11. Id. at 92.
12. ICJ Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 2, at 254.
13. Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Identification of
Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672, at 19-21 (May 22, 2014).
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understood that, in the particular context of CIHL, states not directly
involved in a conflict are not necessarily silent about it; their
statements may be important evidence of opinio juris (just as practice
they may engage in outside the battlefield, such as training
simulations and weapon acquisition, may also be of relevance).
III. WHOSE PRACTICE COUNTS?
This leads to another issue that is particularly relevant in relation
to CIHL: Whose practice counts? A frequent question is whether the
practice of nonstate actors is relevant.14 For example, it is sometimes
argued that the practice and opinio juris of nonstate armed groups
should count for the purposes of determining whether a rule of CIHL
exists or not. It is said, for example, that since they are bound by that
law, their acts, omissions, and opinions should contribute to its
making. Such arguments do not stand up. Individuals are also bound
by international criminal law, but that does not mean that their actions
should contribute to the necessary practice. The ICRC Study states the
position clearly: "The practice of armed opposition groups, such as
codes of conduct, commitments made to observe certain rules of
international humanitarian law and other statements, does not
constitute State practice as such."15
This question is also dealt with in the ILC's draft conclusions.
Conclusion 4, paragraph 1, confirms the primacy of state practice as
creative, or expressive, of rules of customary international law, while
paragraph 2 stipulates that "in certain cases" the practice of
international (intergovernmental) organizations may also be of
relevance. Paragraph 3 then clarifies that the conduct of "other actors"
(and this would include nonstate armed groups) may not. It reads:
"Conduct of other actors is not practice that contributes to the
formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law, but
may be relevant when assessing the practice referred to in paragraphs
1 and 2."16 This paragraph is explained in the commentary as follows:
14. "Nonstate actors" is not a term of art and not without ambiguity. There is no
accepted definition in general use. In the ILC, for example, some members understood
the term to include international organizations, while others rejected such classification;
hence, "other actors" in paragraph 3 of the ILC's draft conclusion 4: ILC Report 2016,
supra note 6, at 76.
15. ICRC STUDY, supra note 3, at xlii.
16. ILC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 76. This conclusion is similar to the
Commission's approach in the context of its work on the topic 'Subsequent agreements
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties'. There it was decided
that "[o]ther conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent
practice . . . Such conduct may, however, be relevant when assessing the subsequent
practice of parties to a treaty." Id. at 121.
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Paragraph 3 makes explicit ... that the conduct of entities other than States and
international organizations-for example, NGOs, non-State armed groups,
transnational corporations and private individuals-is neither creative nor
expressive of customary international law. As such, their conduct does not serve
as direct (primary) evidence of the existence and content of rules of customary
international law. The paragraph recognizes, however, that such conduct may
have an important indirect role in the identification of customary international
law, by stimulating or recording practice and acceptance as law (opinio juris) by
States and international organizations. Although the conduct of non-State armed
groups is not practice that may be said to be constitutive or expressive of
customary international law, the reaction of States to it may well be....
Official statements of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), such
as appeals and memoranda on respect for international humanitarian law, may
likewise play an important role in shaping the practice of states reacting to such
statements; and publications of ICRC may serve as helpful records of relevant
practice. Such activities may thus contribute to the development and
determination of customary international law; but they are not practice as
such.1 7
The tripartite division set out in conclusion 4 is quite similar to
that given in a 2012 article by Anthea Roberts and Sandesh
Sivakumaran on the possible relevance of "lawmaking by nonstate
actors."18 Their division into states, state-empowered bodies, and
nonstate actors corresponds largely to the ILC's division into states,
international organizations, and other actors.1 9 However, while there
is much to be learnt from their generally cautious approach, and from
their description of the current position, the main thrust of their article
is policy oriented and is unlikely to be embraced by states. The ILC, by
contrast, has ought to describe the current position and not to promote
radical change in the way that customary international law develops.
In the Sixth Committee and elsewhere, there seems to be a
consensus as well as to the proposition regarding the primacy of the
practice of states (the primary subjects of international law). There is
also general agreement with respect to the role of "other actors": they
may have an indirect but sometime important role in stimulating,
influencing, or recording the practice and opinio juris of states and
international organizations. It is noteworthy that the ICRC, whose
unique mandate and activity during armed conflicts and other
emergencies may have much influence on international humanitarian
law, appears to be in agreement with this view as well. 20
17. Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added).
18. Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors:
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE
J. INT'L L. 107 (2012).
19. Id. at 110.
20. See Report of the International Law Commission: ICRC Statement to the
United Nations, 2016, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-international-law-commission-icrc-statement-
united-nations-2016 [https://perma.cc/SZB6-P2RK] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
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With regard to the suggestion by some that the practice of
individuals, such as fishermen, has been recognized as giving rise to
customary international law, it is probably more accurate to say that
while:
[i]t cannot be denied, of course, that actions of individuals may create certain
facts which may subsequently become the subject matter of inter-state
dialogue . . . in such circumstances the actions of individuals do not constitute a
law-creating practice: they are just simple facts giving rise to international
practice of states.2 1
IV. SPECIALLY AFFECTED STATES
The ILC's draft conclusion 8, paragraph 1, reads: "The relevant
practice must be general, meaning that it must be sufficiently
widespread and representative, as well as consistent."22 This is
explained in more detail in the commentary:
Paragraph I explains that the notion of generality, which refers to the aggregate
of the instances in which the alleged rule of customary international law has
been followed, embodies two requirements. First, the practice must be followed
by a sufficiently large and representative number of States. Second, such
instances must exhibit consistency. In the words of the International Court of
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the practice in question must
be both "extensive and virtually uniform": it must be a "settled practice."
2 3
The notion of "states whose interests are specially affected" or
"specially affected states" is often referred to in connection with
customary international law, including CIHL. But there is some
misunderstanding of the concept, including within the ILC. While the
text of the draft conclusion does not refer to "specially affected states"
(even though a reference was proposed by the Special Rapporteur24), it
is mentioned in the commentaries in the following terms:
In assessing enerality, an important factor to be taken into account is the extent
to which those States that are particularly involved in the relevant activity or
most likely to be concerned with the alleged rule have participated in the
practice. It would clearly be impractical to determine, for example, the existence
and content of a rule of customary international law relating to navigation in
maritime zones without taking into account the practice of coastal states and
major shipping states, or the existence and content of a rule on foreign
investment without evaluating the practice of the capital-exporting States as
21. G.M. DANRENKo, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 84
(1993).
22. ILC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 94.
23. Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. See Wood, supra note 13, at 38-40, 45.
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well as that of the States in which investment is made. In many cases, all or
virtually all States will be equally concerned.2 5
The importance of the notion of "specially affected states" should
not be overstated. It does not imply that we only look at the practice of
specially affected states, as some seem to fear. It simply means that
their practice has to be included. In the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, the International Court of Justice referred to "a very widespread
and representative participation in the convention [that] might suffice
of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were
specially affected."26
Whether there are specially affected states depends upon the
specific rules in question, not the branch of international law
concerned. For some rules, there are likely to be no states that
are specially affected-all states may be equally affected. It is perhaps
difficult to say in all cases that only those states that are fighting are
specially affected; again, depending on the specifics, other involved
states may also be affected, for example, by a use of nuclear weapons.
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
There was much discussion at the IDF conference about the
relationship between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law. There are at least three major
differences between these two branches of the law, at least one of which
is relevant to the subject matter of this contribution.
First, they are quite different in substance; they reflect different
policies and objectives.
Second, at least as important as the substantive differences, there
are the different enforcement mechanisms. In the case of international
human rights law there is often a comprehensive and compulsory
jurisdiction of the courts, national or regional, and/or of international
supervisory bodies. Conversely, questions concerning the
responsibility of states for violations of international humanitarian law
are less likely to be subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of a court.
Except in the case of international criminal law, international courts
and tribunals will only have jurisdiction where the state concerned has
consented. Thus, despite substantive treaty provisions for reparations,
enforcement hrough the courts is rarely possible.
Third, and here we return to customary international law, IHL is
universal. The Geneva Conventions (though not the Additional
25. ILC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 95 (internal citations omitted).
26. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, 1 73 (Feb. 20).
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Protocols) have been ratified by virtually all states, and CIHL, which
plays so important a role in non-international armed conflicts, is by
definition universal (unless a state can establish itself as a persistent
objector2 7). Conversely, human rights law shows great regional
differences. One example concerns detention. Article 5 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms contains what the European Court of Human Rights has
declared to be an exhaustive list of five circumstances in which
detention is permitted. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, by contrast, prohibits "arbitrary arrest or
detention." This is more open-ended. Despite welcome signs of a more
realistic approach in a 2014 case, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, the
Strasbourg Court's case law remains unpredictable. Moreover, the case
law of the Strasbourg Court is liable to have an important impact in
domestic courts. For example, under the United Kingdom's Human
Rights Act of 1998, any court in the United Kingdom determining a
question that has arisen in connection with a right set forth in the
European Convention must take into account any judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights so far as, in the opinion of the court,
it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it bears emphasizing that IHL is one of the fields of
international law to which the ILC has had particular regard in its
current work on Identification of customary international law. That is
only natural, since it is a field in which customary international law
still plays a central role, especially in relation to non-international
armed conflicts. The experience of CIHL was especially important for
the ILC in relation to a number of central questions.
The ICRC Study was a catalyst for much thinking about the
methodology for determining the rules of customary international law,
just as CIHL itself was a laboratory for appreciating the customary
process more broadly. It is also a field in which there is a considerable
number of recent and important judgments of international and
national courts and tribunals that shed light on several key questions
that arise in the general context of identifying rules of customary
international law.
While the study of CIHL has proven not only important in itself,
but also essential for appreciating the wider issues involved in the
identification of all rules of customary international law, it is believed
that the converse is also true. The general approach to customary
international law, as expounded by the ILC, should assist those called
27. See TIC Report 2016, supra note 6, at 112 (discussing the persistent objector
rule).
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upon to identify rules of CIHL. That basic approach is widely supported
by states, in case law, and in scholarly writings. It serves to ensure
that the exercise of identifying any rules of customary international
law results in determining only such rules as actually exist, thus
promoting the credibility both of the particular determination and of
international law more broadly.
